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ABSTRACT 
Since the outbreak of the European debt crisis, the EU has faced some of its greatest 
challenges to date. Discussions about the downsizing of the Eurozone, the UK exit 
referendum or the increasing success of EU-sceptic parties contradict the vision of an “ever-
closer union.” As disintegration becomes increasingly conceivable, so does our need for a 
conceptual understanding of the compound processes of European integration. In the present 
paper, European integration is understood as a bidirectional and multidimensional process. It 
is assumed that processes of integration and disintegration can occur simultaneously, and that 
their results can be measured with the help of the same indicators. Moreover, European 
integration is not limited to political integration: processes of integration and disintegration 
also proceed in the economic and social dimension. We exemplarily point out the complex 
relations between dynamics of integration and disintegration in its political, economic and 
social dimensions, and we specially focus on the causal relations between indicators of social 
and political integration.  
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1. Introduction 
In past decades, the European Union (EU) has managed to overcome various crises. Usually, 
these crises have been productive episodes, fostering further integration (Kaelble 2013). The 
current crisis, however, is different. As Webber (forthcoming) has pointed out, it is ‘uniquely 
multidimensional, protracted and intense’. It can be characterized as an accumulation of 
different crises: the Eurozone crisis, the Ukraine crisis and the Schengen/‘migration’ crisis. 
These crises have preoccupied the EU for several years and they have been accompanied by 
unprecedented mass politicization (Rauh and Zürn 2014), decreasing support for the EU 
(Maurer 2013, Pew Research Center 2016) and increasing electoral success of EU-sceptic 
parties (Treib 2014). In the Netherlands, people voted against the Association Agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine in April 2016, whereby some campaigners argued in favor of a 
‘NEXIT’. On June 23th, 2016 British voters decided to leave the EU, although a countries’ 
withdrawal from the EU had been predicted to ‘amount to economic suicide’ (Moravcsik 
2012, 68).  
These unprecedented crises of the EU have attracted the attention of scholars of European 
integration. There are now ample publications addressing the possible disintegrative effects of 
the crisis (Eppler and Scheller 2013; Vollaard 2014; Webber 2014; Zielonka 2014). To explain 
the current developments, new theories of integration such as Postfunctionalism (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009; Schimmelfennig 2012) and approaches of flexible integration (Maurer 2004; 
Rittberger, Leuffen and Schimmelfennig 2013) are currently used by some scholars. 
Conventional theories of European integration are being examined with regard to their 
implicit assumptions about potential causes and mechanisms of disintegration (Webber 2014; 
Niemann and Bergmann 2013; Scheller and Eppler 2014). Explanations from other strands of 
theories, such as the research on the stability and collapse of empires (Bieling 2013; Vollaard 
2014; Grande 2012), sociological integration theories (Scheller and Eppler 2013) and 
‘dynamic theories of federalism’ (Eppler forthcoming) are currently being applied to 
European integration. In addition, all kinds of potential scenarios are developed, from the 
economically motivated continuation of integration to the dystopian ‘collapse of the Union’ 
(Krastev 2012, 24). Clear definitions of current phenomena or concise concepts which enable 
their classification are not easily found due to the topicality of events in the ongoing 
discourse. The range of current discussions in European research reflects the variety of 
theoretical approaches concerned with integration, not only regarding the selection, 
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categorisation, and arrangement of single observations, but also with regard to expectations 
and functions of theories (Bieling and Lerch 2012, 14).  
The aim of this paper is to propose ‘conceptual containers’ (Sartori 1970, 1039; cf. Sartori 
2008), in which the results of current dynamics can be classified.
1
 Therefore, we draw on 
different theorists, who in the late 1960s and early 1970s already considered aspects of 
European integration, and whose findings might be useful in the mapping of the current 
situation. In other words, this paper is concerned with aspects of concept formation, which, 
stimulated by the current situation allow recent developments to be recorded and classified 
more precisely. Based on Gary Goertz’ (2006) ontological understanding of social science 
concepts, we ask what constitutes European integration today, and how it can be measured 
empirically. We contribute to the current debate about European disintegration in three ways: 
First of all, like Lindberg and Scheingold (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Lindberg 1971), 
we assume that European integration does not necessarily develop unidirectionally, which is 
why we propose a conceptual openness towards processes of disintegration. We argue that 
processes of integration and disintegration can occur simultaneously, and that their results can 
be measured with the help of the same indicators (section 2). However, we do not assume that 
disintegration automatically implies the complete breakdown of the system, and want to avoid 
a normative bias towards disintegration as well as integration.  
Second, we conceptualize European integration as a multidimensional process and distinguish 
between political, social and economic integration (section 3). This, however, is also not new, 
since Nye (1968) and other early representatives of Neofunctionalism (Haas 1958) and 
Federalism (Friedrich 1964) already assumed a multidimensional understanding of European 
integration, which is why they referred to the connection of political, social and economic 
integration in their theory formation. In section 4, we therefore provide definitions of 
political, social and economic integration and suggest indicators to measure them. 
Third, we want to draw attention to the relation between integration and disintegration 
dynamics in the three dimensions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theory of 
the causal relations between the three dimensions. Section 5 is therefore confined to a 
discussion of some exemplary works on the relations between social and political integration. 
While early studies have largely neglected the social dimension of European integration and 
                                                          
1  Parts of this paper are based on: Anders, Lisa H./Eppler, Annegret/Tuntschew, Thomas. 2016. 
Europäische Integration: zweidirektional und multidimensional. integration 39 (3), 198-212. 
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citizens have been viewed as irrelevant for political integration, there is now a burgeoning 
literature on the relations between social and political integration (cf. Fligstein 2009, Hooghe 
and Marks 2009, Risse 2015). The brief discussion of this literature provides two valuable 
insights: On the one hand, it substantiates the need for a multidimensional understanding of 
European integration. On the other hand, it illustrates that the causal relations between social 
and political integration have yet been determined. The causal interdependencies between 
dimensions and individual indicators, the search for explanatory variables and the formulation 
of hypotheses deserve closer attention in future research. 
As in the past, empirical developments today pose new theoretical challenges to integration 
research (cf. Wiener and Diez 2009; Dinan 2010; Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006). 
Puchala highlighted in his seminal article on ‘blind men, elephants and international 
integration’ (1971) that different interpretations of empiricism are connected with different 
ontological understandings of European integration (cf. Bieling and Lerch, 16). We will 
discuss the meaning of integration as well as its ‘fundamental constitutive elements’ (Goertz 
2006, 5) based on basic requirements for concept formation, as outlined by Goertz. He argues 
for a critical and reflexive approach towards the terms and concepts of social sciences, and 
suggests analyzing complex social phenomena on different levels of abstraction to make them 
empirically tangible. Normally, three levels of social science concepts can be distinguished: 
the first level, which defines the fundamental meaning of a concept; the second level, which 
illustrates different dimensions of meaning by naming constitutive dimensions of the concept; 
and the third level, on which indicators for data collection are specified. Some considerations 
of Goertz might be of particular significance for the conceptualization of European integration 
and disintegration. He argues that, on the first level of concepts, not only positive but also 
negative poles have to be determined. Moreover, he highlights the relevance of reflection on 
the relations between a concept’s dimensions.  
 
2. The dynamics of European integration and disintegration 
Goertz argues that concepts of social science often only include the positive characteristics of 
phenomena, while their negations or opposite meanings (‘negative pole’) are rarely taken into 
account (2006, 31). This criticism applies to at least much of more recent political science 
research on European integration. As Faber and Wessels (2005) have criticized the latter 
suffers from a ‘normative bias’. While there is a rich body of literature on European 
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integration (cf. Rosamond 2000; Wiener and Diez 2009), failed attempts of integration, phases 
of stagnation and disintegration have been less amply researched (see for an exception 
Lindberg 1971). As Zielonka (2011) puts it: ‘we have numerous books on European 
integration, but hardly any on disintegration’. This asymmetry is understandable, given that 
political integration has largely been a successful endeavor. In light of the current crises, 
however, European disintegration has become increasingly conceivable. Therefore, the 
following paragraphs will explicitly address disintegration as the negative pole of a concept of 
integration. 
On this ‘basic level’ of a concept according to Goertz, it is a logical implication that the 
relation of positive and negative poles has to be captured. With regard to integration and 
disintegration, one has to specify whether they are dichotomous, that means mutually 
exclusive phenomena, or if a gradual shift exists, which can be illustrated via a continuum 
with multiple grayscales and hybrid forms. Regardless of their concrete definition, for many 
scholars European integration was empirically seen as a ‘moving target’ (Bieling and Lerch 
2012, 9) and theoretically understood as a process, whereby separate parts form or constitute a 
unified whole (Nye 1968, 856). 2  If European integration is defined as a process, 
disintegration, in turn, must also be a process: the process whereby a formerly unified entity 
disaggregates into its constituent parts. When understood as processes, integration and 
disintegration can be determined in relation to their respective former levels of integration. 
This view is by no means new; in fact, such an understanding of integration was already 
presented by neo-functionalist scholars. In 1970 Lindberg and Scheingold defined a ‘spill-
back’ as the opposite of a ‘spill-over’, as ‘an outcome pattern which is characterized by a 
decrease in sectoral scope or institutional capacities or both’ (1970, 199; cf. Schmitter 1971, 
242).3 In order to measure the results of regional integration and disintegration, Lindberg 
developed ten indicators. The increase of the value of one of these indicators represents 
integration, its decrease disintegration. Lindberg assumed that the values of the indicators 
could simultaneously develop in different directions (Lindberg 1971). Thus, decades ago 
representatives of Neofunctionalism interpreted integration as a reversible process.4 On this 
view, processes of integration and disintegration do not stand in a dichotomous relation to 
each other: they represent parallel and simultaneous dynamics in theory and practice. 
                                                          
2 Cf. Wiener and Diez (2009) for a different understanding of integration as a process, a status and a construct.  
3 For Schmitter a ‘spill-back’ is a “retreat on both dimensions (level and scope), possibly returning to the status 
quo ante initiation” (ibid.). 
4 Cf. also the approach of „dialectical funcionalism“, Corbey (1995). 
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The end result of the processes of European integration and disintegration are not currently at 
the heart of research interest. The finalité of European integration has always been politically 
and theoretically contested. There is no consensus on the end state of the integration process. 
From a conceptual point of view, the final result of the integration process will be reached 
when the indicators that measure integration processes have achieved their maximum values. 
For instance, if political integration only referred to the transfer of competences from the 
national to the European level, the process of integration could by definition only proceed as 
long as these competences can be transferred. And vice versa, European disintegration could 
only occur as long as competences from the European level can be transferred back. If social 
integration referred to the evolution of an exclusive European identity the process could only 
proceed up to the point where each European citizen has an exclusive European identity. 
Social disintegration, in turn, could only take place up to the point where each citizen has 
ceased to identify with Europe. These maximal values or end poles depend on the respective 
understanding and operationalization of integration. They limit a specific spectrum in which 
integration and disintegration can take place. In line with this reasoning, European 
disintegration does not necessarily mean the complete breakdown of the EU, just as European 
integration does not necessarily imply ‘complete integration’. It rather describes a process 
which, in extreme cases, may lead to the aforementioned consequences (Eppler and Scheller 
2013, 31). Whether a specific result of integration or disintegration is desirable or not, is 
obviously a normative question that should not guide conceptual considerations. Therefore, 
the present draws the reader’s attention towards an indicator-based measurement of—usually 
gradual—dynamics that operate in two directions. 
Some of these insights correspond with research on comparative federalism, which assumes 
that national multi-level-systems are subject to the constant dynamics (Benz 1985; Benz and 
Broschek 2013) and processes of centralization and decentralization which take place 
simultaneously. A ‘federal continuum’ is used as a template, in order to locate the degree of 
centralization and decentralization of federal systems (Riker 1964,1975; Schultze 2005, 252 
f.).  
To conceptualize integration and disintegration as contrary, temporally overlapping processes 
and to measure them with the same indicators does not imply that both processes are subject 
to the same causes and mechanisms. Moreover, something ‘disintegrated’ might look 
completely different from something which had never been integrated before: historical 
institutionalism teaches us to include temporal factors (Pierson 2000). Due to the rigidity of 
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institutions one can assume that the formation and expansion of a system is easier than its 
disintegration.5 
 
3. The dimensions of European integration and disintegration 
According to Goertz, the constitutive elements of a concept are determined on the ‘secondary 
level.’ A glance at different theories of European integration makes it clear that differences 
and theoretical debates are located on this ‘secondary level.’  
At the beginning of the integration process, scholars perceived European integration as a 
multidimensional process and highlighted the interrelations between the dimensions. Turning 
away from the idea of early federalists (cf. Freiburghaus and Grädel 2005), namely that 
Europe could be made all at once, the politicians who founded the Union spurred economic 
integration which they regarded as a prerequisite for political integration. At the same time, 
they expected that political integration would eventually result in social integration.6 Theorists 
of integration also underlined the interdependence of the three dimensions of integration, 
although their assumptions on how the dimensions were causally linked differed. According 
to Deutsch (1966), increasing trans-border interactions result in intensified communication 
and the development of a sense of community. Friedrich considered social integration as a 
prerequisite for political integration (Friedrich 1964). Haas also highlighted the societal 
aspects of European integration. He defined integration as a process ‘whereby political actors 
in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre’ (Haas 1958, 16) and assumed that it would result in ‘a 
new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones’ (Haas 1958, 16). 
Similarly, Nye (1968) contended that European integration is a multidimensional process. He 
argued that integration comprises political as well as economic and social integration. 
In the meantime, political science integration research seems to have temporarily lost sight of 
the three-dimensional understanding of European integration. In recent decades, studies have 
predominantly focused on the analysis of political integration and consolidation and the 
enlargement processes, and therefore on the political—institutional and territorial —
dimension of integration. The underlying societal dimension of European integration, in 
                                                          
5For factors stabilising the European Union cf. Kelemen (2007). 
6 Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950: http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-
declaration/index_de.htm (26.5.2016). 
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contrast, has been ‘more or less ignored’ (Delhey 2004, 3). This does not come as a surprise, 
and reasons are closely linked with unfulfilled expectations of the ‘founding fathers’ 
mentioned above: social integration took place, but much slower than economic and political 
integration. For decades, European integration remained an elite project. Based on the 
‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 62)—the passive support of 
citizens—European integration proceeded in a technocratic fashion (Checkel and Katzenstein 
2009, 2). Thus, later integration theories did not consider social factors such as the citizens’ 
identities and attitudes towards the EU as relevant explanatory factors of political integration 
(Höreth and Mann 2013; Schimmelfennig 2010, 52).  
The idea of a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 62) was challenged 
when the discussion about a so-called “EU democratic deficit” took off after the failure of the 
referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in Denmark in 1992 (Reif 1993). As a result, the 
multi-dimensional concept of integration was, at least, partly revitalized. Consequently, recent 
theoretical political science approaches, such as Post-functionalism (Hooghe and Marks 2009) 
and Neo-gramscianism (Gill 2001), also started debating the role played by the population, or, 
respectively, of the economy. The social dimension of European integration has especially 
attracted the attention of students of European integration (Favell and Guiraudon 2009; 
Fligstein 2008; Guiraudon and Favell 2011; Hooghe and Marks 2009). Moreover, the 
systematic consideration of the multidimensional nature of European integration has become a 
focal point of theory formation. Fligstein (2008, 10) sees European integration going on in 
‘economic, social, and political fields […] across Europe,’ and thus as the development of 
economic, social and political arenas of interaction. Similarly, Trenz characterizes European 
integration as a project, ‘that stretches from market building to polity building and society 
building’ (2011, 200).7 A few of the above-mentioned ‘dynamic theories of federalism’ (cf. 
Braun 2004, 136 f.) also include different dimensions of a multi-level system. They look for 
causes of institutional dynamics in other arenas or dimensions (Lehmbruch 2000; Benz and 
Broschek 2013), such as in economic (Oates 1972) and social ones (Livingston 1952; 
Friedrich 1964; 1968; 1972; Montesquieu 1748). 
 
                                                          
7 The growing interest of sociology in European integration has contributed significantly to this change of 
perspective: Bach (2008); Keutel (2011); Favell and Guiraudon (2009); Trenz (2012); Guiraudon and Favell 
(2011). 
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4. Measuring political, economic, and social integration and disintegration 
Without doubt, European integration is compound process, in which institutional innovation 
on the European level, economic integration, as well as societal interaction are all parts of a 
larger development. On the third level of concept building according to Goertz, indicators 
have to be identified for all dimensions of the concept. The number of possible indicators to 
measure the results of integration and disintegration is almost unlimited and for none of the 
three dimensions is there an uncontroversial set of indicators. Our contribution to the ‘dis-
integration debate’ is therefore limited to an exemplary outlining of potential indicators for 
Goertz’s third level of concept formation. It does not pursue the goal of a final 
operationalization.  
Political integration in general describes the process of consolidation and enlargement of the 
European Union, thus the integration of states. Economic integration includes the formation 
of a transnational economy, thus the convergence of single national economies to a regional 
economic area (Nye 1968, 858; El-Agraa 2001, 1). Social integration describes the process in 
which ‘different parts of a social system integrate to a cohesive entity’ (Keutel 2011, 150, 
translation).   
Differences between political, economic and social integration concerning the units and 
modes of integration have implications regarding the measurement of integration and 
disintegration. The level of political integration is comparatively easy to determine by looking 
at the de jure integration laid down in the treaties. They mention the member states and 
clearly codify the issue-areas in which the EU has decision-making authority. This does not 
apply to social and economic integration. The outcomes of social and economic integration 
cannot be measured by means of unequivocal de jure indicators. Contrary to political 
integration, social and economic integration processes are neither rule-based nor laid down in 
the treaties (cf. Delhey 2004), but they are rather fluid processes and much harder to 
determine. 
 
4.1 Political integration and disintegration 
The understanding of what political integration is—what theoretical properties it carries and 
what causations it implies—has changed over time in accordance with the actual development 
of the EC/EU (Rosamond 2000) and up until now, political integration does not have one 
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authoritative definition. Regarding the operationalization of political integration, Lindberg 
and Scheingold (1970) distinguished between level and scope of integration. Their distinction 
and also their operationalizations are still widely used in integration research (Börzel 2005; 
Pollack 2000; Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006). The scope of integration is defined as 
the ‘expansion of EU authority to new polity areas’ (Börzel 2006), the level of integration is 
defined as ‘the relative importance of Community decision-making as compared with national 
processes’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). 
Similarly, Schimmelfennig and Rittberger differentiate between a sectoral and a vertical 
dimension of political integration. In accordance with Lindberg and Scheingold’s concept of 
scope, Schimmelfennig and Rittberger define sectoral integration as the process ‘through 
which new policy areas or sectors are increasingly regulated at the EU level’ (Schimmelfennig 
and Rittberger 2006, 74). The vertical dimension of integration ‘refers to the distribution of 
EU competencies between EU institutions’ (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006, 75).. 
According to Schimmelfennig and Ritterber it tells us if and how many decisions are taken at 
the national or at the European level. Other authors (Börzel 2005) also consider how these 
decisions are taken. 
The scope of political integration has been operationalized in different ways. While Schmitter 
(1996) measured the level of integration by counting how many policy decisions were made 
at the national and the European level,8  Börzel did not consider the decisions but rather 
measured the ‘number of issues in a given policy sector for which the EU has power to 
legislate’ (Börzel 2005, 220). Both aspects are crucial. It is important to know whether the EU 
has the power to legislate and it is similarly important to know whether European institutions 
use their capacities to legislate. 
The level of European integration has been operationalized by Börzel (2005) by means of a 
five-point scale, reaching from intergovernmental coordination to supranational 
centralization. In addition, Schimmelfennig and Rittberger consider a horizontal dimension of 
integration. This dimension of integration refers to the ‘territorial extension of sectoral and 
vertical integration’ (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006, 76). Horizontal integration takes 
place if the number of member states increases.  
                                                          
81 = All policy decisions at the national level; 2 = Only some policy decisions at the EC level; 3 = Policy 
decisions at both national and EC level; 4 = Mostly policy decisions at the EC level; 5 = All policy decisions at 
the EC level Schmitter (1996, 125f). 
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More precise indicators are both thinkable and desirable. For instance, the capacities of stable 
institutions to solve problems could be measured. Moreover, possibilities of classification of 
formal flexibilization and processes of group formation could be useful (cf. Schimmelfennig, 
Leuffen, Rittberger 2014).  
Table 1: Political Integration 
Political Integration Indicators 
Scope / sectoral dimension Degree of EU authority in new polity areas 
1 = All policy decisions at the national level 
2 = Only some policy decisions at the EC level 
3 = Policy decisions at both national and EC level 
4 = Mostly policy decisions at the EC level 
5 = All policy decisions at the EC level 
Level / vertical dimension Mode of decision-making at the European level 
0 = exclusive national competences 
1 = intergovernmental co-ordination 
2 = intergovernmental co-operation 
3 = joint decision-making 1 
4 = joint decision-making 2 
5 = supranational decision-making 
Horizontal dimension Number of member states 
Flexible integration / territorial differentiation 
Source: Schmitter (1996), Börzel (2005), Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006). 
 
Turning the definition and indicators of integration on their head, political disintegration may 
be understood as a process whereby either (1) level or (2) scope of political integration 
decreases, or (3) member states withdraw from the EU or from its policies.9 
 
4.2 Economic Integration and Disintegration 
Conventional approaches capture the economic level of integration with recourse to different 
stages of market opening and political market coordination (e.g. free trade area, customs 
union, common market and a complete economic union) (Balassa 1962). Economic 
integration is therefore understood as the removal of trade-barriers and the development of a 
central coordination with common policies. 10  However, simply determining economic 
integration via the respective legal-institutional framework falls short of the desired outcome. 
It does not, for example, provide any information about the actual market behavior within the 
                                                          
9 Apart from formal disintegration such as the re-nationalization of competences or a member state’s withdrawal 
from the EU, another behavioral form of disintegration seems possible: level and scope could formally persist 
while European actors lose their capacity to legislate due to resistance from national actors. Kelemen describes 
such a development as “atrophy”: “EU institutions would continue to exist in more or less their current form, but 
would be increasingly ignored by governments and interest groups (…). Over time, the EU would cease to be a 
significant forum for policymaking.” (Kelemen 2007, 63) 
10 On the distinction between negative and positive integration: Tinbergen (1954). 
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defined geographic area (Fligstein 2008, 68). There are, however, countless price- or quantity-
based indicators, or sets of indicators available, in order to grasp the realities of market 
integration (Shure 2013, 105–124).11 The challenge is to select suitable indicators that are 
simple yet complex enough to provide information not only about the integration of sub-
markets, but also about economic integration as a whole. 
An attempt to empirically grasp the complexity of the economic integration of the EU in a 
compound index has been made by König (2014). In order to determine the integration of 
national economies in the common market, he not only includes legal-institutional factors, but 
also behavioral market factors. He therefore additionally takes economic convergence and 
homogeneity between the member states as well as the symmetry of economic developments 
into account. The EU-index is built upon 25 indicators and is used to capture the economic 
interdependence of individual as well as clustered national economies within the EU (König 
and Ohr 2013, 1088). Although the EU-index is based on a specific understanding about the 
ideal monetary area, it nonetheless documents that different economic indicators easily run 
contrary to each other and, more generally, even contrary to political integration. Considering 
for example the development of national GDPs, price levels, labor costs and debts with regard 
to ‘homogeneity’, there was a growing gap between EU member states between 1999 and 
2010 against the backdrop of increasing political integration (König and Ohr 2013, 1084). 
Table 2: Economic Integration 
Economic Integration Indicators 
Legal understanding Stages of economic integration: free trade area, customs 
union, common market, economic union, and complete 
economic integration 
Comparing legal frames for businesses: rules of exchange, 
property rights, and rules of completion and cooperation 
 
(In fact political integration) 
Economic indicators Quantity-based understanding 
Private dimension: degree and quantities of inter-national 
exchange of goods, services, capital and people 
(e.g. intra-EU trade in % of GDP, share of country’s working population 
coming from other member states) 
Public dimension: degree and quantities of jointly 
administrated services / re-distributional expenditures / 
                                                          
11 For example, the development of inter-national and supra-regional export volumes, the extent of cross-
border/transnational investments or corporate mergers, and the share of national and commonly managed 
budgetary resources are typical quantity-based indicators, whereas price-based indicators include typically costs 
of production factors or interest rates of, for example, government bonds (Nye 1968, 861; Fligstein 2008, 81ff.; 
Shure 2013). 
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common budget at EU-level 
Price-based understanding 
Testing the law of one price: factor prices across given 
market area (e.g. production costs, interest rates on 
government bonds) 
Business cycle symmetry Growing coupling of GDP growth rate, inflation rate, change 
in unemployment and government net borrowing over time. 
Source: based on Balassa (1962); Nye (1968); Fligstein (2008); Schure (2013); König (2014, 16–17). 
Economic integration can therefore be defined as convergence of significant economic 
indicators and the growing symmetry of economic developments between geographic entities 
within a geographic area. Thus, economic disintegration is understood as growing divergence 
of these economic indicators and the economic decoupling of the geographic entities. 
4.3 Social Integration and Disintegration 
In line with Deutsch (1966), we attempt to grasp societal integration along three dimensions: 
trans-border interactions, the evolution of a communicative space in Europe, and the 
evolution of a sense of community among people of the member states. 
First, social integration can be measured by looking at the intensified social interactions 
across Europe. Potentially there are countless indicators to investigate these interactions 
(Fligstein 2008, 165 ff.). Delhey (2004) mentions, among other things, interstate migration, 
mutual interest and knowledge. Other indicators such as the acquisition of a second European 
language and inter-European marriages could be added.  
Second, social integration can be understood as the evolution of a communicative space in 
Europe. Various scholars have argued that due to structural impediments, the evolution of a 
genuine pan-European public sphere is highly unlikely (Risse 2015, 17). European citizens 
speak various languages and the media remain nationally segmented, ‘which give privileged 
access to national political actors keen on reproducing national identities over European 
actors’ (Diez Medrano 2011, 44). Therefore, research has mainly focused on the 
Europeanization of national public spheres (Diez Medrano 2009, 90; Risse 2015, 3; Vreese 
2007, 10; Koopmans 2015). In the past, the Europeanization of national public spheres has 
been investigated mainly along three dimensions: the salience of European affairs in national 
discourses, the role of European actors, and the similarities and differences of frames in these 
discourses (Risse 2015, 10 f.).  
Third, social integration can be measured by investigating the evolution of a European 
identity. The meaning of this concept of ‘European identity’ is contested (Kaina and 
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Karolewski 2013, 40). Put in simplified terms, it refers to the extent that European citizens 
from different member states have developed a sense of ‘we-ness’ and perceive themselves as 
belonging to the same political European entity. European identity has commonly been 
measured via surveys (for an overview see Kaina 2010). The bulk of empirical studies relied 
on Eurobarometer data. Even though this data source is far from being perfect (Höpner and 
Jurczyk 2012), it provides an insight into long-term trends regarding European identity.  
Table 3: Social Integration 
Social Integration12 Indicators 
Trans-border interaction of 
European citizens 
Interstate migration 
Mutual interest and knowledge, foreign language 
competences 
European public sphere / 
Europeanized public spheres 
Salience of European issues in national public debates 
Convergence of frames in national public debates 
European Identity Survey data 
Source: Fligstein (2008); Kaina and Karolewski (2013); Risse (2015); Vreese (2007). 
Therefore, social disintegration in our understanding means a process whereby either (1) the 
trans-border interactions of European citizens decrease, or (2) the Europeanization of national 
public spheres decreases, or (3) identities re-nationalize. 
4.4 Interdependencies between dimensions and indicators 
To resume, European integration and disintegration, when understood as processes that are 
simultaneously taking place and whose outcomes can be measured by the same indicators, can 
be illustrated with the help of the outlined indicators. The increase of an indicator’s value 
would indicate integration, while its decrease would indicate disintegration. However, with 
the help of the indicators proposed, the empirical phenomena observed currently (for an 
overview of the empirical developments cf. Eppler and Maurer 2016) can only be measured 
partially. And moreover, like many other indices capturing multi-level systems (cf. Hooghe, 
Marks and Shakel 2016), they are only able to capture the outcomes of integrative and 
disintegrative processes.  
Integration and disintegration within the three dimensions do not necessarily occur at an equal 
rate or magnitude. Whole dimensions, as well as single indicators within a dimension, can 
                                                          
12  When measuring social integration by means of these three indicators, we need to clarify when social 
integration is high or low and what completed social integration would look like. Delhey (2004) suggests 
evaluating levels of social integration by means of comparison, for example, social integration “would be fully 
achieved if intergroup relations between the EU nationalities were mutually as frequent and cohesive as in-group 
relations within these nationalities” Delhey (2004, 20). Koopmans suggests comparing the Europeanization of 
public debates with the communicative structures found in contemporary national spheres (Koopmans 2015, 54). 
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develop differently and in opposite directions. Considered empirically, integration within the 
three dimensions took place at different paces: the level of economic and political integration 
that has already been reached is far higher than the level of social integration. In addition, 
empirically observed reciprocal effects exist between different dimensions (territorial 
expansion leads to economic divergence, that is the decline of the economic level of 
integration, whilst territorial reduction would probably facilitate political decision-making) 
and individual indicators (‘Disintegrative tendencies in sociostructural terms open up chances 
of integration in the discursive area’ (Bach 2015, 214 translation)).  
The interdependencies between dimensions and individual indicators deserve closer attention. 
Goertz reminds us not only to list constitutive dimensions of concepts, but also to define their 
relations. Fligstein states: ‘It is one thing to assert that there has been economic, social and 
political fields created across Europe, and quite another to theorize their linkages’ (Fligstein 
2008, 10). Causal relationships can be assumed, hypotheses on these relationships need to be 
formulated tested in a further step. Although we cannot provide such a theory at the moment, 
the next section is going to lay out recent explanatory work that focuses on the interrelations 
of the three dimensions with a focus on the social dimension.  
 
5. How much social underpinning does the EU need? 
As has been mentioned before, political, economic and social integration has proceeded at 
different speeds. Compared with the impressive steps towards political and economic 
integration in the last decades, social integration seems to lag behind (Bach 2008; Bartolini 
2005; Fligstein 2008). This applies at least to two of the three dimensions of social integration 
outlined above. Trans-border interactions, measured by inter-state migration, are still modest: 
‘today, less than one in fifty Europeans lives outside their country of origin, and numbers have 
not grown appreciably with any of the major steps toward European integration’ (Favell 2009, 
178). Only a small group of Europeans is involved in trans-border interactions and economic 
integration ‘has produced patterns of interaction mainly amongst the young, educated, 
business owners, and managerial, professional, and white-collar workers’ (Fligstein 2008, 
156). Regarding the second indicator of social integration, the Europeanization of the public 
spheres, things look different. In scholarly literature, there is general agreement ‘that coverage 
of EU issues in national media has increased substantially since at least the mid-1990s’ (Risse 
2015, 11). This is corroborated by recent studies on the politicization of the EU. These studies 
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confirm the increasing number of EU issues discussed in public debates in the member states 
and expect the politicization of the EU to be of lasting nature (de Wilde and Zürn 2012; 
Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016). This rising salience of EU issues in national debates, 
however, does not automatically lead to a convergence of frames in public debates on EU 
issues. As became evident during the critical stage of the Euro crisis, there was no consensus 
about the causes of and the adequate measures to contain the crises. On the contrary, the 
frames in the public discourses in creditor and debtor countries differed markedly.  
Irrespective of the transfer of competences to the European level, the creation of a common 
market and the rising salience of EU-issues in national debates, the number of people who 
have a primarily European identity has remained fairly low and stable during the last two 
decades (Diez Medrano 2011, 36; Polyakova and Fligstein 2015, 60). Even the Euro crisis 
hardly had any effect on levels of European identity (Risse 2014). Currently, on average 38 
per cent of European citizens claim to have a purely national identity, 54 per cent claim to 
have dual—national and European—identities, and two per cent claim to have a European 
identity only (Eurobarometer 83.3, 2015).13 A comparison with levels of national and sub-
national identification reveals tremendous differences. Even in Switzerland—one of the most 
plurinational states in Europe—52 per cent of the population identify themselves as ‘more 
Swiss than member of their region’ or ‘only Swiss’ (Diez Medrano 2011, 36). 
Levels of European identity not only vary by country (Risse 2014) but also by social strata. 
People with higher socio-economic status are more likely to see themselves as Europeans 
(Fligstein 2008, 138 ff.; Fligstein 2009, 140 f.; Kuhn 2015). This does not come as a surprise 
given that these people usually benefit from Europe. They are more mobile, have broader 
language skills and profit from the creation of the common market. People with lower socio-
economic status usually do not share this experience. They do not have ‘the opportunity to 
learn second languages or interact for business or travel with their counterparts in other 
countries’ (Fligstein 2008, 156). 
This brief discussion shows that political and economic integration has not been accompanied 
by strong social integration. As Diez Medrano has put it: ‘The Europe that is unfolding is not 
and will not be in the foreseeable future a European society in the strong sense’ (Diez 
Medrano 2011, 28). For decades this has not been seen as a problem. However, now, in view 
                                                          
13 In 2010 on average 46 per cent of European citizens claimed to have a purely national identity, 41 per cent 
claimed to have dual identities, and seven per cent reported to have a European identity only (Eurobarometer 77, 
Spring 2012, European Citizenship Report). 
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of the multiple crises of the EU, this asynchrony of political, economic and social integration 
might lead to disintegrative consequences.  
As various studies demonstrated, the measures to contain the Euro crises spurred political 
integration (Schimmelfennig 2012), even though they have led to ‘the rise of new EU 
institutions alongside, and partly in competition with, the central institutions of the traditional 
Community Method’ (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016, 47). At the same time attempts to 
contain the debt crisis by means of austerity policies have created socially disintegrative 
consequences in the member states. As Polyakova and Fligstein have shown, these measures 
were accompanied by the constituents’ increasing sense of alienation from Europe and its 
politics (Polyakova and Fligstein 2015, 79, cf. Armingeon, Guthmann and Weisstanner 2015). 
These developments raise the question of how much social underpinning the EU and the 
common market need to exist and sustain the EU project. Is there enough ‘solidarity among 
strangers’ (Habermas 2006, 67) for further integration steps? Is there enough sense of ‘we-
ness’ to stabilize the EU in times of severe crises?14 
According to Risse, the present levels of European identity sufficiently underpin further 
integration: given that the majority of European citizens claims to have at least dual 
identities—a national and a European one—he assumes that they are willing to support further 
integration. According to him, the present ‘Europeanization of national identities is sufficient 
to sustain carefully crafted (re-)distributive policies on the European level’ (Risse 2014, 
1208). Yet, other scholars adopt a more critical stance. According to Kelemen, the growing 
gap between the dramatically expanded competences of the EU on the one hand and the static 
levels of European identity on the other hand increases the likelihood ‘that the EU’s power 
has grown to the point where it exceeds the necessary basis of 'identity' safeguards’ (Kelemen 
2007, 60). Fligstein, too, argues that ‘there are not enough people with strong European 
identities to push forward a Europe-wide political integration project’ (Fligstein 2009, 154). 
This especially seems to hold for re-distributive policies (Kaina and Karolewski 2013, 5). 
Recent studies on the politicization of the EU share this critical assessment. They argue that 
mobilization occurs on the basis of this missing or ‘underdeveloped’ European identity. This 
is supposed to lead to a ‘constraining dissensus’ that might result in ‘downward pressure on 
the level and scope of integration’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 21). Especially right-wing EU-
sceptic forces frame European integration in terms of national identity (de Vries and Edwards 
                                                          
14Trust in or support of the EU is another question. However, trust in a political institution is not in itself an 
indicator of “social integration,” understood as the integration of people. Another open question is how 
“democracy” is related to European integration and disintegration.  
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2009) and they do so with increasing success. Webber (2014) argues that the growing strength 
of EU-sceptic parties in many member states has eroded the governments’ capacity to 
exclusively control the EU agenda. In addition, he notes that the national governments’ ability 
‘to implement the terms of EU accords against hostile domestic interest, opinion, protest and 
even strikes has been increasingly called into question’ (Webber 2014: 353).  
This brief discussion shows that the effect of social (dis-)integration on political integration is 
currently disputed. While some scholars see sufficient social underpinning for further 
integration, others expect that the mobilization along the fault lines caused by the missing 
European identity might affect the level of political integration. Future research needs to 
further explore the causal interrelations between integration and disintegration in the three 
dimensions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The present paper has discussed the concept of European integration and disintegration. We 
defined European disintegration as the negative pole of European integration. While 
integration research of political science has, due to the disciplinary division of labor, focused 
on the political-institutional dimension, and moreover, assumed integration to be a 
unidirectional ongoing process, we proposed a bidirectional, multidimensional, and 
interdependent understanding of European integration and disintegration. 
First, we argued that the results of integration and disintegration can be measured with the 
same indicators. As already proposed by late Neofunctionalists, integration and disintegration 
are understood as processes, which might occur gradually, simultaneously and overlapping. 
With the help of indicators suggested in this paper, the outcomes of integration and 
disintegration processes can be measured: the increase of the value of an indicator indicates 
integration, while its decrease indicates disintegration. 
Second, we have argued in favor of a multidimensional concept of European disintegration to 
avoid an institutional or constitutional bias trap. In accordance with Nye, Fligstein and other 
authors, we conceptualized European integration and disintegration along the three 
dimensions of political, economic and social integration and disintegration. We provided 
examples of indicators to measure the effects of integration and disintegration processes. 
These indicators are modifiable and expandable with good arguments. 
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Based on these considerations we arrive at an understanding of integration which classifies 
integration and disintegration as gradual and relational processes, which can take place 
simultaneously and multidirectional in different dimensions. Such a bidirectional 
conceptualisation preserves scientific neutrality with regard to the developmental direction. 
The multidimensionality facilitates the categorisation of integrative and disintegrative 
dynamics and enables us to sharpen our understanding of causal relations in further steps.   
The fact that the outcomes of integrative and disintegrative processes can be measured with 
the same indicators does not imply that the causes and mechanisms of integration and 
disintegration are the same. At this point it becomes apparent that only certain aspects of a 
concept have been discussed in this paper. If dynamics are not analyzed separately but as 
dimensions of a broader phenomenon, the question of complex interdependencies between the 
three dimensions and between different indicators arises. In the present paper, we have 
exemplarily outlined multiple connections with the social dimension—understood as 
explanatory as well as response variables. Questions regarding the complex interdependencies 
between the three dimensions as well as between different indicators remain. The formation 
of hypotheses and their empirical assessment needs to be addressed in future research.  
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